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GUNDY V. UNITED STATES: BREATHING NEW (AND 
UNEXPECTED) LIFE INTO THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE 
BRANDON K. WHARTON* 
 
In Gundy v. United States,1 the Supreme Court of the United States 
considered whether title 34, section 20913(d) of the United States Code,2 
which allows the Attorney General of the United States to “specify the 
applicability” of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s 
(“SORNA”) registration requirements to pre-Act offenders, violates the 
nondelegation doctrine.3  The nondelegation doctrine is a principle of 
constitutional and administrative law that “bars Congress from transferring 
its legislative power to another branch of Government.”4  The Court held that 
section 20913(d) does not violate the nondelegation doctrine because it 
“makes clear that the Attorney General’s discretion extends only to 
considering and addressing feasibility issues.”5  Because the Court’s 
statutory interpretation of section 20913(d) is consistent with Reynolds v. 
United States,6 which also interpreted the statutory meaning of SORNA, and 
because section 20913(d) provides an intelligible principle to guide the 
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 1.  139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
 2.  See 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d) (2018) (“The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify 
the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the 
enactment of this chapter or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for 
the registration of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable 
to comply with subsection (b).”). 
 3.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121 (“This case requires us to decide whether 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d), 
enacted as part of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), violates [the 
nondelegation] doctrine.”). 
 4.  Id. at 2121–23. 
 5.  Id. at 2123–24. 
 6.  565 U.S. 432 (2012); see infra Section IV.A. 
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Attorney General’s discretion,7 the outcome in Gundy was correct.  The 
Court, however, underemphasized the many practical consequences that 
would have followed if the dissent’s view had prevailed.8 
I.  THE CASE 
In October 2005, Herman Gundy “pleaded guilty under Maryland law 
for sexually assaulting a minor.”9  At the time, Gundy was on supervised 
release for an unrelated federal offense.10  A conviction for sexual assault 
under Maryland law was a violation of the terms of Gundy’s federal 
supervised release.11  As a result, in March 2006, Gundy also pleaded guilty 
in federal court to violating the conditions of his release.12  After completing 
both his state and federal prison sentences, Gundy took up residence in the 
state of New York.13  Under the registration requirements of SORNA—as 
specified in regulations promulgated by the Attorney General—Gundy was 
required to register as a sex offender.14  This he did not do.15 
Accordingly, the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York found Gundy guilty of failing to register as a sex offender.16  
He then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, which affirmed the lower court’s decision and rejected Gundy’s 
assertion that SORNA violated nondelegation principles.17  Notably, the 
Second Circuit’s opinion did not include any substantive discussion on the 
merits of Gundy’s nondelegation claim.18 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to determine 
whether section 20913(d), enacted as part of SORNA, violates the 
                                                          
 7.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 8.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 9.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122; see also United States v. Gundy, 804 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 
2015) (“Herman Gundy was convicted of violating Maryland Criminal Law § 3-306, Sexual Offense 
in the Second Degree.”), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
 10.  United States v. Gundy, 695 F. App’x 639, 640 (2d Cir. 2017) (“While serving a federal 
sentence for violating Maryland Criminal Law § 3-306, Sexual Offense in the Second Degree, 
during his supervised release for a prior federal offense, Gundy was transferred from Maryland to a 
federal prison in Pennsylvania.”), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
 11.  Gundy, 804 F.3d at 143. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122. 
 14.  Id.  SORNA was enacted in 2006.  See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 12 Stat. 587, 587–88 (adopting SORNA in Title I). 
 15.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122. 
 16.  Id. at 143. 
 17.  United States v. Gundy, 695 F. App’x 639, 641 n.2 (2d Cir. 2017) (rejecting Gundy’s 
argument, which was made only for preservation purposes, that SORNA violates the nondelegation 
doctrine), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019). 
 18.  Id. 
 
1088 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:1086 
nondelegation doctrine by allowing the Attorney General to “specify the 
applicability” of SORNA’s registration requirements for pre-Act offenders.19 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In Gundy v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States 
declined to invoke the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate an act of Congress 
that empowers the Attorney General to “‘specify the applicability’ of 
SORNA’s . . . requirements” for pre-Act offenders.20  Section II.A examines 
the statutory language of SORNA and the Court’s interpretation of the Act’s 
text and purpose in the relevant predecessor case of Reynolds v. United 
States.21  Section II.B. recounts the origins and early applications of the 
nondelegation doctrine.22  Lastly, Section II.C discusses the Supreme Court’s 
articulation of the “intelligible principle standard” and retreat from using the 
nondelegation doctrine to strike down federal laws.23 
A.  Enacting and Interpreting SORNA in Reynolds 
Before tracing the history and applications of the nondelegation 
doctrine, it is helpful to understand the goals and statutory framework of 
SORNA.24  The Act addresses a matter that had been on Congress’s mind for 
decades—requiring individuals “convicted of certain sex crimes to provide 
state governments with (and to regularly update) information, such as names 
and current addresses, for inclusion on state and federal sex offender 
registries.”25  Before SORNA’s enactment, sex offender registration 
“consisted of a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state registration 
systems.”26  In response, the Act was designed to promote uniformity and 
efficacy by repealing existing federal sex offender registration laws and 
replacing them with a single comprehensive registration scheme (i.e. 
SORNA).27 
Among its provisions, SORNA mandates that sex offenders provide and 
update information that will be used on federal and state sex offender 
                                                          
 19.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122–23 (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d)). 
 20.  Id. (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d)) (“The District Court and Court of Appeals . . . rejected 
[Gundy’s nondelegation] claim, as had every other court (including eleven Courts of Appeals) to 
consider the issue. . . . Today, we join the consensus and affirm.” (citation omitted)). 
 21.  See infra Section II.A. 
 22.  See infra Section II.B. 
 23.  See infra Section II.C. 
 24.  Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 34 U.S.C. §§ 20901–91 (2018). 
 25.  Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 434 (2012). 
 26.  Id. at 435. 
 27.  Id. 
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registries (“registration requirements”).28  Offenders who do not comply with 
SORNA’s registration requirements are subject to a prison term of at least 
one year.29  The Act applies prospectively for those offenders who were still 
in prison (or had not yet been convicted) at the time of SORNA’s enactment 
(“post-Act offenders”).30  It also applies retroactively to those offenders who 
were released from prison before SORNA took effect (“pre-Act 
offenders”).31   
Post-Act offenders are required to register before they are released from 
prison in accordance with section 20913(b).32  Of course, some offenders 
literally cannot satisfy this provision because they were released from prison 
prior to SORNA ever becoming law.33  In other words, even if that group of 
offenders (i.e. the pre-Act offenders) registered and kept their registration 
current, they would not be doing so until after their release from prison.34  
This would violate section 20913(b).35  To resolve this dilemma, section 
20913(d)—the particular provision of SORNA at issue in Gundy—says that 
pre-Act offenders who cannot comply with the section 20913(b) requirement 
are subject to rules of registration as specified by the Attorney General.36 
Still, a pertinent question remains: If you are a pre-Act offender, do you 
have to register even if the Attorney General has not promulgated rules of 
registration yet?37  That is, does the text of SORNA automatically mandate 
that pre-Act offenders register unless they have been given a waiver of some 
sort, or does it instead suggest that pre-Act offenders do not have to register 
until the Attorney General affirmatively says that they must?38  That was the 
question presented to the Court in Reynolds v. United States.39  And in 
                                                          
 28.  34 U.S.C. § 20913(a) (“A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in 
each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the 
offender is a student.”). 
 29.  Id. § 20913(e) (“Each jurisdiction, other than a Federally recognized Indian tribe, shall 
provide a criminal penalty that includes a maximum term of imprisonment that is greater than 1 year 
for the failure of a sex offender to comply with the requirements of this subchapter.”). 
 30.  Id. § 20913(b). 
 31.  Id. § 20913(d). 
 32.  Id. § 20913(b). 
 33.  See Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 441 (2012) (“The Second Statement, for 
example, says that a sex offender must register before completing his prison term, but the provision 
says nothing about when a pre-Act offender who completed his prison term pre-Act must register.”). 
 34.  See id. (explaining that “Pre-Act offenders, aware of such complexities, lacunae, and 
difficulties, might . . . reach different conclusions about whether, or how, the new registration 
requirements applied to them”). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  34 U.S.C. § 20913(d). 
 37.  Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 434 (explaining that the Court had to determine when the registration 
requirements take effect with respect to pre-Act offenders). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
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Reynolds, the Court held that SORNA’s registration requirements only apply 
to pre-Act offenders once “the Attorney General specifies that they do 
apply.”40 
As part of its statutory analysis, the Court in Reynolds made two 
observations about the Act that are relevant to the corresponding statutory 
analysis in Gundy.  First, it noted that Congress intended for pre-Act 
offenders to be covered by SORNA’s registration requirements.41  Second, 
the Court explained that Congress had “no reason to believe” that the 
Attorney General would not promulgate rules mandating the registration of 
pre-Act offenders.42  In a dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia also agreed that 
the Act was intended to apply to pre-Act offenders.43  According to his 
dissent, it was “simply implausible that the Attorney General was given 
discretion to determine whether coverage of pre-Act offenders (one of the 
purposes of the Act) should exist.”44  But, unlike the majority, Justice Scalia 
thought that section 20913(d) meant that SORNA automatically applies to 
pre-Act offenders subject only to any exceptions made by the Attorney 
General.45 
B.  Origins and Applications of the Nondelegation Doctrine 
Though the Reynolds Court considered when the provisions of SORNA 
would apply to pre-Act offenders, it did not consider whether delegating this 
power to the Attorney General was constitutionally permissible in the first 
place.  That is to say, the Reynolds Court did not contemplate whether 
section 20913(d) was a violation of the nondelegation doctrine.  And while 
this question was ultimately answered by the plurality in Gundy, it is first 
necessary to understand what the nondelegation doctrine is and how it has 
been applied by the Court. 
The power to legislate is vested in the Congress through Article I of the 
United States Constitution.46  And, though the Court has recognized that 
Congress retains the ability to “obtain[] the assistance of its coordinate 
Branches,”47 the Court has also held that Congress is precluded from 
delegating “strictly and exclusively legislative” powers from itself to other 
                                                          
 40.  Id. at 435 (emphasis added). 
 41.  Id. at 442. 
 42.  Id. at 444–45. 
 43.  Id. at 450 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 450–51. 
 46.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress 
of the United States . . . .”). 
 47.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
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branches of government.48  As a result, if the power delegated by Congress 
is exceedingly broad and purely legislative in character, then the delegation 
will not pass constitutional muster.49  This concept is known as the 
nondelegation doctrine.50 
The Court was receptive to nondelegation challenges to federal laws on 
two occasions in 1935.51  In each case, the Court looked to the breadth of the 
statute at issue to discern whether the challenged provisions transferred too 
much policymaking power from Congress to the executive branch.  In both 
cases, the Court concluded that Congress had, in fact, impermissibly 
delegated power to a coordinate branch of government.52  And thus, at least 
for a very brief time,53 the nondelegation doctrine became one route for the 
judiciary to invalidate acts of Congress.54 
In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,55 the Court invoked the nondelegation 
doctrine to nullify a statutory provision that delegated power from Congress 
to the President but did not instruct the President on when or how to use that 
power.56  At issue in that case was a particular aspect of the National 
Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”) that authorized the President to prohibit 
the transportation of “hot oil” (i.e. petroleum and petroleum products that 
exceeded certain statutory quotas) in interstate or foreign commerce.57  
Importantly, NIRA’s hot oil provision did not outline “circumstances or 
conditions in which transportation of petroleum or petroleum products should 
be prohibited.”58  In other words, discretion was left to the President alone to 
                                                          
 48.  Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43 (1825); see also Panama Refining Co. 
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (“The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or 
transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.”). 
 49.  Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 421. 
 50.  See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371–72 (explaining that “Congress generally cannot 
delegate its legislative power to another Branch”).  A helpful corollary is to consider nondelegation 
inquiries as a particular application of a separation of powers analysis.  When a legislative enactment 
is found to have violated nondelegation principles, the Court is saying the provision has not 
accorded due respect for the separation of powers—a feature that is, of course, required by the 
Constitution.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 319 
(2000) (explaining that “the principle of nondelegation might seem . . . an inevitable implication of 
the division of powers”).  
 51.  See infra notes 55 and 63 and accompanying text. 
 52.  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373. 
 53.  See infra Section II.C. 
 54.  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373. 
 55.  293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 56.  Id. at 417–18. 
 57.  Id. at 414–15, 418; see also id. at 436 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (“Oil produced or 
transported in excess of a statutory quota is known in the industry as ‘hot oil,’ and the record is 
replete with evidence as to the effect of such production and transportation upon the economic 
situation and upon national recovery.”). 
 58.  Id. at 417 (majority opinion). 
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determine when—if at all—the prohibition should be imposed.59  Because 
NIRA’s hot oil provision did not declare policy, establish a standard, or lay 
down a rule for when the President was authorized to invoke the prohibition, 
the Court held that it violated the nondelegation doctrine.60  At the same time, 
though, the Court noted that delegations of legislative power are permissible 
when Congress provides an intelligible principle that instructs the delegee on 
how and when the power may properly be exercised.61 
Just a few months later, in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States,62 the Court employed the same rationale—that excessive delegations 
of policymaking power are unconstitutional—to nullify another provision of 
NIRA.63  Under NIRA’s “Live Poultry Code,” the President was given 
authority to either (1) approve regulations of the poultry industry that 
promote “fair competition” if those regulations were proposed by trade or 
industrial associations, or (2) promulgate such regulations on his own 
motion.64  Violations of the Code were punishable as misdemeanors and 
carried a fine of up to $500 per offense.65  After recounting its analysis in 
Panama Refining Co., the Court again emphasized that “Congress cannot 
delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion 
to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed.”66  But, the Court said, this 
was exactly what the Live Poultry Code allowed.67  Among its faults, the 
Live Poultry Code never defined what constituted “fair competition.”68  
Rather, the Act seemed to leave it to the executive branch to determine for 
itself what “fair competition” meant.69  And, in so doing, the executive 
branch alone could determine what conduct was and was not criminal under 
                                                          
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at 430. 
 61.  Id. at 429–30 (“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to 
which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, 
such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” (quoting J.W. Hampton, 
Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928))). 
 62.  295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 63.  Id. at 551. 
 64.  Id. at 521–23 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 703) (1933)). 
 65.  Id. at 523. 
 66.  Id. at 537–38. 
 67.  Id. (noting that under the Live Poultry Code, the President has broad power to impose codes 
that operate as penal statutes). 
 68.  Id. at 531 (“The Act does not define ‘fair competition.’”). 
 69.  Id. (“What is meant by ‘fair competition’ as the term is used in the act?  Does it refer to a 
category established in the law, and is the authority to make codes limited accordingly?  Or is it 
used as a convenient designation for whatever set of laws the formulators of a code for a particular 
trade or industry may propose and the President may approve (subject to certain restrictions), or the 
President may himself prescribe, as being wise and beneficent provisions for the government of the 
trade or industry in order to accomplish the broad purposes of rehabilitation, correction, and 
expansion which are stated in the first section of title 1?”). 
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the Live Poultry Code.70  As a result, the Live Poultry Code provision of 
NIRA was also rendered an unconstitutional violation of nondelegation 
principles.71 
Both Panama Refining Co.72 and A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. relied 
on a legal principle, now known as the intelligible principle standard, derived 
from the 1925 case of J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States.73  In J.W. 
Hampton, the Court stated as follows:  
If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible 
principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates 
is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden 
delegation of legislative power.  If it is thought wise to vary the 
customs duties according to changing conditions of production at 
home and abroad, it may authorize the Chief Executive to carry out 
this purpose, with the advisory assistance of a Tariff Commission 
appointed under Congressional authority.74 
Put differently, the J.W. Hampton Court indeed recognized that there are 
limits to the delegation of certain legislative authority, but in so doing, it also 
implicitly recognized that there are at least some permissible acts of 
delegation.75 
C.  The Court’s Retreat from Nondelegation and Articulation of an 
Intelligible Principle Standard 
Two of the cases cited above—Panama Refining Co. and A.L.A. 
Schecter Poultry Corp.—are the only instances in which the Court has used 
the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate federal laws.76  The Court has 
rejected every nondelegation challenge to a federal law ever since.77  Strictly 
speaking, both of those decisions remain good law to this day.  But the Court 
more clearly articulated the modern approach to nondelegation challenges in 
Mistretta v. United States.78 
                                                          
 70.  Id. at 537–38. 
 71.  Id. at 542. 
 72.  Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 429–30 (1935) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & 
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). 
 73.  276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
 74.  Id. at 409. 
 75.  See Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 430 (explaining that “the Court has recognized that 
there are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend”). 
 76.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“As the Court 
points out, we have invoked the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation to invalidate a law only 
twice in our history, over half a century ago.”). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
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Pervasive in the federal criminal justice system before the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 was a practice called “indeterminate sentencing.”79  
Although federal statutes specified minimum and maximum penalties for 
federal crimes, they also gave sweeping discretion to sentencing judges to 
determine the severity of an offender’s punishment.80  This discretion was 
shared, in part, with the federal parole commission.81  The results were 
problematic.82  It was not uncommon for similarly situated defendants to 
receive vastly different sentences depending on who the sentencing judge 
happened to be.83  In response, Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act 
of 1984, which made drastic changes to the federal sentencing regime as it 
existed at the time.84 
Most relevant for the present discussion, the Act revoked discretion 
from sentencing judges and created an independent commission (i.e. the 
Sentencing Commission) that was authorized to impose mandatory 
sentencing ranges on the United States district courts.85  In effect, the Act 
tasked the Sentencing Commission with devising “sentencing guidelines for 
every federal criminal offense.”86  It also made the sentence, once imposed, 
basically determinate.87  The Act abolished the federal parole system, limited 
the opportunity for an offender to appeal their sentence, and limited 
opportunities for early release.88  As for the composition of the Sentencing 
Commission itself, the statute envisioned a bipartisan group of federal judges 
and other selected members who would serve a fixed term and could only be 
removed from their positions for cause.89 
A few years after the Act took effect, John Mistretta brought a challenge 
to the new sentencing regime, asserting that it was a violation of the 
nondelegation doctrine.90  According to Mistretta, Congress provided the 
Sentencing Commission with excessive legislative power by allowing the 
Commission to determine mandatory sentencing ranges.91  But Mistretta had 
a problem.  Unlike the essentially standardless delegations of power in 
                                                          
 79.  Id. at 363–67 (majority opinion). 
 80.  Id. at 363, 365–66. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  See id. at 365 (“Serious disparities in sentences . . . were common.”). 
 83.  Id. (recounting prior attempts by Congress to reduce the sentencing disparities between 
individual judges). 
 84.  Id. at 367–69. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 371. 
 87.  Id. at 367. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 368–69. 
 90.  Id. at 370.  At the point his case reached the Supreme Court, John Mistretta had already 
pleaded guilty to conspiracy and agreement to distribute cocaine.  Id. at 370–71. 
 91.  Id. at 371. 
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Panama Refining Co. and A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp.,92 Congress 
included a whole host of guiding factors, purposes, and principles that the 
Commission was required to consider as it fashioned its sentencing 
guidelines.93  For example, the Commission was required to “use current 
average sentences ‘as a starting point’ for its structuring of the sentencing 
ranges,”94 evaluate “the nature and degree of the harm caused by the crime,”95 
and ensure that violent and repeat offenders received substantial time in 
prison.96  To be sure, the Act still left the Commission with a large amount 
of discretion.97  In fact, the Commission was even left to decide “which types 
of crimes and which types of criminals are to be considered similar for the 
purposes of sentencing.”98  Even still, the Court did not agree with Mistretta’s 
assessment that the Act’s delegated powers were too broad and too legislative 
in character to withstand a constitutional challenge.99 
Writing for a near-unanimous court,100 Justice Harry Blackmun 
explained “that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever 
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”101  In 
upholding the Act, the Court’s majority once again emphasized that 
nondelegation challenges must be resolved under J.W. Hampton’s 
“‘intelligible principle’ test.”102  That is to say, as long as Congress has 
provided the delegee with an intelligible principle to guide its exercise of the 
delegated power, the delegation is constitutionally permissible.103 
Following the Mistretta decision, the Court has upheld, among others, a 
law allowing the Secretary of Transportation to impose user fees on pipeline 
operators that were used to fund federal pipeline safety programs104 and a law 
permitting “the Attorney General to add or remove substances [to a schedule 
of drugs under the Controlled Substances Act], or to move a substance from 
                                                          
 92.  See supra Section II.B. 
 93.  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374–77 (describing the many guidelines and directives that Congress 
included in the Sentencing Reform Act). 
 94.  Id. at 375 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (1994)). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 376–77. 
 97.  Id. at 377. 
 98.  Id. at 377–78. 
 99.  Id. at 371. 
 100.  Justice Scalia was the lone dissenter. 
 101.  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. 
 102.  Id.(quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)); see 
supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 103.  Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372–73. 
 104.  Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 214–15 (1989). 
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one schedule to another.”105  The Court (post-Schecter) has yet to identify a 
single legislative delegation that fails the intelligible principle test.106 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Gundy v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States 
addressed whether section 20913(d) of SORNA, which allows the Attorney 
General to promulgate regulations that specify the registration requirements 
for pre-Act offenders, was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power 
from Congress to the Attorney General.107  In a plurality opinion authored by 
Justice Kagan, the Court upheld section 20913(d) on the basis that it does not 
violate nondelegation principles because the provision affirmatively requires 
the Attorney General to “apply SORNA’s registration requirements as soon 
as feasible to offenders convicted before the statute’s enactment.”108  Thus, 
under the plurality view, section 20913(d) only allows the Attorney General 
to delay enforcement of SORNA against pre-Act offenders for feasibility 
reasons.109   
The Court began by acknowledging that Congress is prohibited from 
delegating or transferring strictly legislative power, but it noted that Congress 
is not precluded from every act of delegation.110  Congress is permitted to 
delegate power so long as it provides an “intelligible principle” to guide the 
delegee (here, the Attorney General) in their exercise of discretion.111  As a 
result, nondelegation inquiries (including the one at issue in Gundy) are 
largely questions of statutory interpretation.112  The determination of whether 
Congress enacted a statute containing an intelligible principle will, in turn, 
answer the constitutional question—whether the nondelegation doctrine has 
been violated.113 
For that reason, Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion begins by answering 
the following question: Does SORNA—as Gundy and the dissenters 
contend—provide the Attorney General with “‘unguided’ and ‘unchecked’ 
                                                          
 105.  Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 162 (1991). 
 106.  See supra note 76. 
 107.  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2122–23 (2019) (plurality opinion). 
 108.  Id. at 2121 (emphasis added).  This is to say that the Attorney General may not exercise 
his discretion to determine whether SORNA should apply to pre-Act offenders in the first place.  
This must be done as soon as practicable or feasible.  This Note will refer to this concept as the 
“feasibility standard.” 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. at 2123. 
 111.  Id. (“The constitutional question is whether Congress has supplied an intelligible principle 
to guide the delegee’s use of discretion.”). 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
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authority”?114  According to the plurality, the answer to that question is no.115  
The statute’s purpose and history reveal the opposite intent by Congress.116  
As Justice Kagan explained, the Court already interpreted the statutory 
meaning of SORNA when it decided Reynolds v. United States.117 
In Reynolds, the Court determined that SORNA was intended to cover 
both post-Act and pre-Act offenders.118  Congress realized, however, that 
implementing a comprehensive registration program would present a major 
logistical concern: A large number of pre-Act offenders would have to be re-
registered or newly registered.119  Some of the offenders, for example, may 
have already registered under existing state registry schemes.120  Moreover, 
many offenders would not be able to comply with the section 20913(b) 
requirement to register before completing their prison sentence because their 
prison sentence ended well before SORNA took effect.121  Anticipating these 
administrative and transitional concerns, Congress crafted a solution in 
section 20913(d): The Attorney General would be responsible for examining 
the issues and enforcing the registration requirements of SORNA against the 
pre-Act offenders as soon as the transitional difficulties were resolved.122 
In explaining the plurality’s interpretation of section 20913(d), Justice 
Kagan noted that statutory interpretation is a “holistic endeavor” that looks 
not just to the challenged text by itself (as Gundy sought to do), but to the 
challenged text in the full context in which it appears, alongside its purpose 
and history.123  And because everything from SORNA’s declaration of 
purpose to its legislative history and definition of the term “sex offender” 
suggests a congressional intent for SORNA to cover pre-Act offenders, 
Gundy’s argument fell short.124  According to the plurality, a holistic 
statutory analysis of SORNA reveals that section 20913(d) “order[s] [pre-Act 
offenders’] registration as soon as feasible.”125 
Because the authority conferred by Congress to the Attorney General 
was limited only to allowing the Attorney General enough time to resolve 
                                                          
 114.  Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 37, 45, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086)). 
 115.  Id. at 2128 (“The phrase [‘specify the applicability’] instead means ‘specify how to apply 
SORNA’ to pre-Act offenders if transitional difficulties require some delay.”). 
 116.  Id. at 2125 (“Congress had made clear in SORNA’s text that the new registration 
requirements would apply to pre-Act offenders.”). 
 117.  Id. at 2124. 
 118.  Id. at 2122. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 2124–25; see also supra text accompanying notes 33–36. 
 122.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2125. 
 123.  Id. at 2126 (quoting United Sav. Ass’n. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)). 
 124.  Id. at 2127. 
 125.  Id. at 2128. 
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practical issues before enforcing SORNA against pre-Act offenders, the 
plurality concluded that Congress provided an intelligible principle.126  And 
because the Court routinely upholds acts of Congress that give executive 
officials discretion to implement governmental programs, the Court 
concluded that section 20913(d) did not present a nondelegation concern and 
was constitutionally permissible.127 
In a brief solo concurrence, Justice Alito agreed with the plurality that 
SORNA did not offend the nondelegation doctrine given how the Court has 
interpreted the doctrine since 1935.128  At the same time, however, he 
signaled that he would support an effort to reconsider the Court’s approach 
to the nondelegation doctrine if reconsideration could garner majority 
support on the Court at a later time with the full Court’s participation.129 
The dissent, written by Justice Gorsuch, considered the plurality’s view 
of the nondelegation doctrine to be fundamentally at odds with the Framers’ 
notion of separation of powers.130  And not only did the dissent’s 
constitutional analysis favor Gundy, so too did its statutory analysis.131 
In interpreting section 20913(d) of SORNA, Justice Gorsuch rejected 
the plurality’s reading—that the Act requires the Attorney General to impose 
its registration requirements on pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible.132  
Much to the contrary, the dissent believed that SORNA gave the Attorney 
General “carte blanche”133 about whether to take action.134  In the dissent’s 
view, the plurality simply “reimagine[d] the terms of the statute” by reading-
                                                          
 126.  Id. at 2129. 
 127.  Id. at 2130. 
 128.  Id. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that the Court has uniformly rejected 
nondelegation challenges since 1935 and has upheld all delegations in which the statute includes a 
“discernable standard”). 
 129.  Id. at 2131 (“If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have 
taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.  But because a majority is not willing to do 
that, it would be freakish to single out the provision at issue here for special treatment.”).  Justice 
Kavanaugh was recused in Gundy.  Later, in a statement respecting a denial of certiorari in an 
unrelated case, Justice Kavanaugh indicated that he would be open to the dissent’s new approach to 
nondelegation cases.  Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
in denial of certiorari) (“I write separately because Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the 
Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in 
future cases.”). 
 130.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. at 2132 (“As the Department of Justice itself has acknowledged, SORNA ‘does not 
require the Attorney General’ to impose registration requirements on pre-Act offenders ‘within a 
certain time frame or by a date certain; it does not require him to act at all.’” (quoting Brief for 
United States at 23, Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012) (No. 10-6549))). 
 133.  Id. at 2144. 
 134.  Id. at 2132 (“Congress thus gave the Attorney General free rein to write the rules for 
virtually the entire existing sex offender population in this country . . . .”). 
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in a feasibility standard.135  More, Justice Gorsuch suggested that his 
colleagues in the plurality misunderstood the Act’s legislative history.136  
According to the dissenting opinion, Congress did not include the “specify 
the applicability” provision in section 20913(d) because of feasibility 
concerns; it did so because members of Congress could not agree on what to 
do with the pre-Act offenders.137  In short, the dissent said that Congress—
apparently caught between a rock and a hard place—passed the buck to the 
Attorney General, including on the central question of whether anything 
should be done at all.138  The most plausible statutory analysis, as the dissent 
viewed it, is that SORNA allows the Attorney General to make “unbounded 
policy choices.”139  But even if the plurality’s statutory analysis—that section 
20913(d) includes a feasibility standard—was correct, the dissent asserts that 
SORNA would still be vulnerable to a nondelegation challenge.140  Why?  
According to the dissent, even a feasibility standard is too broad of a 
delegation.141  Because feasibility can mean different things to different 
people, the dissent argued that the term is too amorphous for there to be 
meaningful judicial review of whether the Attorney General’s actions were 
because of feasibility concerns or for some other reason entirely.142 
And that takes us to the constitutional question.  Unlike Justice 
Kagan,143 Justice Gorsuch’s dissent did not apply the intelligible principle 
test to determine whether the SORNA delegation is constitutional.144  The 
dissent declined to do so because under its view the intelligible principle test 
is entirely untethered from the Framers’ constitutional design and does not 
                                                          
 135.  Id. at 2131. 
 136.  See id. (“Congress concluded that something had to be done about these ‘pre-Act’ 
offenders too.  But it seems Congress couldn’t agree what that should be.”). 
 137.  Id. at 2131–32.  
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. at 2133. 
 140.  Id. at 2145 (“But even this new dream of a statute wouldn’t be free from doubt.  A statute 
directing an agency to regulate private conduct to the extent ‘feasible’ can have many possible 
meanings: It might refer to ‘technological’ feasibility, ‘economic’ feasibility, ‘administrative’ 
feasibility, or even ‘political’ feasibility.  Such an ‘evasive standard’ could threaten the separation 
of powers if it effectively allowed the agency to make the ‘important policy choices’ that belong to 
Congress while frustrating ‘meaningful judicial review.’  And that seems exactly the case here . . . .” 
(quoting Indus. Union Dep’t., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 676, 685–86 (1980) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment))). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 2129 (plurality opinion) (“As noted earlier, this Court has held that a delegation is 
constitutional so long as Congress has set out an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide the delegee’s 
exercise of authority.” (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 
(1928))). 
 144.  Id. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (characterizing the intelligible principle test as a 
“misadventure” by the Court). 
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even find support in the case in which the phrase was first uttered.145  
According to the dissenters, the correct way to determine the permissibility 
of a congressional delegation is not by resorting to the familiar intelligible 
principle test but rather by conducting a tripartite “traditional separation-of-
powers test[].”146 
Under such an approach, Congress is permitted to delegate authority—
without offending the separation of powers—in only three circumstances.147  
First, Congress may allow another branch of government to “fill up the 
details” when Congress itself has made the underlying policy decision.148  In 
these instances, delegation is acceptable because Congress has provided 
enough information for the courts and the public to determine whether or not 
the delegee has followed (or exceeded) Congress’s guidance.149  Second, 
Congress is permitted to enact laws that are contingent on fact finding by the 
executive branch.150  So, for example, Congress can pass a law that schedules 
the construction of a bridge, and it can condition the bridge’s construction on 
a cabinet secretary first making a “finding” that such a bridge would not 
interfere with navigation capabilities.151  In essence, the “fact-finding” 
standard says that Congress can make the operation of a new law contingent 
upon a specified triggering condition.152  This, under the dissent’s analysis, 
would not raise a separation of powers concern.153  Third, Congress may 
assign non-legislative responsibilities to the other branches (for example, 
Congress can assign certain foreign affairs powers to the executive branch 
because those powers are inherently within the scope of executive power).154  
In other words, there is no separation of powers concern when Congress 
“delegates” power to the executive branch that is already properly within the 
scope of executive power.155 
This tripartite test, according to the dissent, is what Chief Justice Taft 
really was getting at when he first used the term “intelligible principle” in 
                                                          
 145.  Id. at 2139 (“This mutated version of the ‘intelligible principle’ remark has no basis in the 
original meaning of the Constitution, in history, or even in the decision from which it was 
plucked.”). 
 146.  Id. (“For two decades, no one thought to invoke the ‘intelligible principle’ comment as a 
basis to uphold a statute that would have failed more traditional separation-of-powers tests.”).  This 
Note  will refer to this test interchangeably as the “tripartite test,” “modified test,” or “dissent’s 
test.” 
 147.  Id. at 2136–37. 
 148.  Id. at 2136 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)). 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 2136–37 (citing Miller v. Mayor of New York, 109 U.S. 385, 393 (1883)). 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. at 2137. 
 155.  Id. 
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J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States.156  The dissent argued that SORNA 
does not satisfy any of the prongs of the above-mentioned test.157  First, it 
does not “fill up the details”158 because the applicability of SORNA’s 
registration requirements to pre-Act offenders is not a “detail” in any sense 
of the word.159  Rather, it is a major policy concern that would implicate some 
500,000 offenders.160  Second, there was no “fact-finding” involved in 
section 20913(d) because the text of the provision did not set any criteria for 
when or how to enforce the statute against pre-Act offenders.161  And third, 
SORNA has nothing to do with foreign affairs or other inherent powers of 
the executive branch.162  Because, according to the dissent, the delegation in 
section 20913(d) failed the tripartite test, it constituted an impermissible 
delegation of legislative power.163 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Gundy v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that section 20913(d) of SORNA did not violate nondelegation principles 
because the provision required the Attorney General to apply SORNA’s 
registration requirements to pre-Act offenders “as soon as feasible.”164  
Gundy was correctly decided because the Court’s statutory interpretation of 
SORNA in Reynolds v. United States already revealed that the Attorney 
General is accorded only limited discretion under the Act.165  Moreover, the 
Gundy plurality opinion remains faithful to the approach the Court has taken 
with nondelegation cases since 1935.166  The plurality opinion would have 
been made more persuasive, however, by emphasizing the practical 
consequences of reviving the nondelegation doctrine given the regularity 
                                                          
 156.  Id. at 2139 (“And when Chief Justice Taft wrote of an ‘intelligible principle,’ it seems plain 
enough that he sought only to explain the operation of these traditional tests; he gave no hint of a 
wish to overrule or revise them.”). 
 157.  Id. at 2143–44. 
 158.  Id. at 2136 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)). 
 159.  Id. at 2143 (“But it’s hard to see how the statute before us could be described as leaving 
the Attorney General with only details to dispatch.”). 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. (“Far from deciding the factual predicates to a rule set forth by statute, the Attorney 
General himself acknowledges that the law entitles him to make his own policy decisions.”). 
 162.  Id. at 2143–44. 
 163.  See id. at 2145 (“Most everyone, the plurality included, concedes that if SORNA allows 
the Attorney General as much authority as we have outlined, it would present ‘a nondelegation 
question.’”). 
 164.  See supra Section III. 
 165.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 166.  See infra Section IV.B. 
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with which Congress delegates limited authority to executive officials and 
agencies to implement policy.167 
A.  The Plurality’s Statutory Analysis of SORNA Is Convincing, 
Especially in the Aftermath of Reynolds 
When the Court decided Reynolds in 2012, it realized that Congress 
fashioned SORNA to obligate the Attorney General to take certain actions 
(namely, “to apply the new requirements to pre-Act offenders”).168  Yet, 
according to the dissenting opinion in Gundy, section 20913(d)’s delegation 
went too far because it gave the Attorney General “a blank check” to exercise 
discretion in whatever manner the Attorney General saw fit.169  But as Justice 
Kagan observed in the plurality opinion, the Court has never read the 
provisions of SORNA so broadly.170  And because the Reynolds Court 
already adopted a narrow interpretation of SORNA,171 the Reynolds 
interpretation of SORNA merits deference under the doctrine of statutory 
stare decisis.172 
1.  The Reynolds Court Already Determined that SORNA Only 
Provides the Attorney General with Limited Delegated Powers 
A close reading of Reynolds reveals the Gundy dissenters’ position—
that the Attorney General could refuse to apply SORNA to pre-Act 
offenders—was one of the arguments the Government made when the Court 
first considered the breadth of SORNA in 2012.173  But this was an argument 
that was rejected by the Court then and is no more persuasive now.174  
Although the Court acknowledged that SORNA did not apply to pre-Act 
offenders until the Attorney General affirmatively said that it did,175 the Court 
never stated (or even implied) that the Attorney General could simply decline 
to implement the statute’s provisions against pre-Act offenders in the first 
                                                          
 167.  See infra Section IV.C. 
 168.  Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 444–45 (2012). 
 169.  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2144 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 170.  Id. at 2124 (plurality opinion) (“[W]e made clear [in Reynolds] how far SORNA limited 
the Attorney General’s authority.  And in that way, we effectively resolved the case now before 
us.”). 
 171.  See infra Section IV.A.1. 
 172.  See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 173.  Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 444–45 (“The Act’s language, the Government continues, 
consequently gives the Attorney General the power not to specify anything . . . . [Yet,] [t]his 
argument bases too much upon too little.”). 
 174.  Id.  Although the Reynolds Court concluded that SORNA’s provisions do not apply to pre-
Act offenders until the Attorney General says they apply, the Reynolds Court never suggested that 
the Attorney General possessed the power to conclude—on his own initiative—that they would 
never apply.  
 175.  See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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place.176  On the contrary, the Reynolds majority noted that it would be 
difficult to believe Congress thought the Attorney General would fail to apply 
SORNA’s requirements to pre-Act offenders given that a primary objective 
of the Act was to ensure all offenders (both pre-Act and post-Act offenders) 
would be subject to the Act’s registration requirements.177  Even the Reynolds 
dissenters agreed with the majority on this point.178  And so, even though the 
Gundy dissent critiques the plurality’s reliance on legislative history,179 
SORNA’s legislative history—at least as far as the legislation’s core 
purposes and reach are concerned—seems to have been largely agreed upon 
by the Reynolds Court.180 
But as the Gundy dissenters tell the story, SORNA’s legislative history 
at most reveals the “hope[s] and wishe[s]”181 of some members of Congress 
that perhaps some of the pre-Act offenders would someday be subject to 
SORNA’s registration requirements.182  Consider, though, SORNA’s 
statement of purpose.  There, Congress made its objective clear: It sought to 
create a “comprehensive” registration scheme for those offenders implicated 
by SORNA.183  And given this background, the delegation in section 
20913(d) has quite a lot of meaning.  It is not, as the dissent argues, a vague 
expression of faith that the Attorney General might take action someday.184  
It would be quite counterintuitive indeed to assume that Congress created a 
“comprehensive” sex offender registration scheme that, for some reason or 
another, did not have to apply to pre-Act offenders.185 
Thus, Justice Kagan’s view that SORNA requires the Attorney General 
to specify the Act’s applicability to pre-Act offenders “as soon as feasible”186 
is not only a reasonable statutory interpretation but also the most likely.187  
Principal Deputy Solicitor General Jeffery Wall, who argued in favor of 
SORNA’s constitutionality on behalf of the United States, made much the 
                                                          
 176.  See supra text accompanying notes 42 and 44. 
 177.  Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 444 (“[The power claimed by the Government] is inconsistent with 
Congress’ intent to ensure the speedy registration of thousands of ‘lost’ pre-Act offenders . . . .”). 
 178.  See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 
2116, 2124 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“In recognizing all this, the majority (temporarily) bonded 
with the dissenting Justices, who found it obvious that SORNA was ‘meant to cover pre-Act 
offenders.’” (quoting Reynolds, 565 U.S. at 448 (Scalia, J., dissenting))). 
 179.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2147 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 180.  See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 181.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2146 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id. at 2126–27 (plurality opinion). 
 184.  See supra text accompanying note 181. 
 185.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2126–27 (plurality opinion) (defining the term “comprehensive” as 
“all-encompassing or sweeping”). 
 186.  Id. at 2121. 
 187.  See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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same point during oral argument: “And I—to be honest with you, I think it 
defies both the text of SORNA and reality to think that Congress was agnostic 
about whether hundreds of thousands of people who have committed very 
serious sex offenses, as Petitioner has, should be required to register.”188 
Simply put, the fact that section 20913(d) allows some level of 
discretion is hardly dispositive of whether the Act allows absolute 
discretion.189  And as Justice Kagan explained during oral argument, no 
member of the Reynolds Court, which interpreted the same provision, 
disagreed with the premise that Congress intended for the statute to cover 
pre-Act offenders.190  Nothing about the statute’s history or purpose leads to 
such a belief.191  After all, Congress had a good reason for not requiring 
“instantaneous registration”192 of pre-Act offenders in the statute itself—it 
would have been a logistical impossibility for all of the pre-Act offenders to 
strictly comply with the text of SORNA if not for language allowing them to 
be phased in over time.193 
2.  The Statutory Interpretation in Reynolds Carries Special Weight 
Under the Doctrine of Statutory Stare Decisis 
Because the plurality’s rationale is consistent with the statutory 
interpretation of the Reynolds Court, the plurality decision finds added 
support in the doctrine of statutory stare decisis.194  Under this doctrine, the 
Court gives greater precedential force to its own statutory interpretations than 
it does its constitutional interpretations.195  As then-Professor Amy Coney 
                                                          
 188.  Oral Argument at 47:19, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-6086. 
 189.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2126 (plurality opinion) (noting that such an argument only prevails 
if one reads “the first half of § 20913(d), isolated from everything else”). 
 190.  Oral Argument at 10:20, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-6086 (“[Justice Scalia] — he was dissenting, but nine Justices 
in Reynolds all had the same view of this statute, which is that this statute demanded 
comprehensiveness in the registration of pre-Act sex offenders.  In other words, both in the majority 
and in the dissent, this was the one point in common, that they said this statute was designed for 
something and this statute did something, that it insisted that ‘sex offender’ should be read broadly 
to include any individual who was convicted of a sex offense and that all those people should be 
registered, you know, with some feasibility recognition.”). 
 191.  See supra Part III. 
 192.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130 (plurality opinion) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 
432, 443 (2012)). 
 193.  Id. at 2128. 
 194.  See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 317, 317 (2005) (explaining “that a party advocating the abandonment of a statutory 
precedent bears a greater burden” than a party advocating the abandonment of a constitutional 
precedent). 
 195.  Id.; see also Lawrence M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 
1165, 1175 (2016) (“Often called ‘statutory stare decisis,’ the principle that precedents in statutory 
cases are not to be overturned lightly is justified on several grounds.”); see, e.g., Toolson v. New 
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Barrett196 explains, statutory stare decisis is often defended under two 
primary lines of thought.197  First, some believe that if Congress has failed to 
amend a statute (say, for example, SORNA) after the Court’s first attempt at 
construing its meaning (here, the decision in Reynolds), then Congress has 
acquiesced to the Court’s interpretation.198  Otherwise, the theory goes, 
Congress would not have remained silent but would have taken legislative 
action to correct the Court’s interpretive mistake.199  Second, others believe 
that statutory stare decisis is a defensible doctrine because of separation of 
powers concerns.200 
According to then-Professor Barrett, the separation of powers approach 
to statutory stare decisis was prominently supported by Justice Black.201  He 
believed that statutory interpretation necessarily involves some level of 
policymaking—a task the judiciary should be reluctant to engage in.202  
Accordingly, Justice Black’s position was that if the Court must engage in 
policymaking to resolve a case or controversy, it should do so as infrequently 
as possible.203  In other words, it should make a policy determination only 
once and allow the interpretation to stand unless instructed otherwise by 
Congress.204  Professor Lawrence Marshall takes a slightly different view 
than Justice Black.205  Rather than viewing statutory stare decisis as a 
“constitutional mandate,” Professor Marshall views the doctrine as “an 
                                                          
York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (refusing to revisit an earlier statutory interpretation 
of federal antitrust laws).  But see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 
GEO. L.J. 1361, 1427–39 (1988) (providing examples of when the Court has opted to overrule its 
past statutory interpretations). 
 196.  Amy Coney Barrett is now a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit.  See David G. Savage, Amy Coney Barrett Is the Favorite of Social Conservatives, but 
Democrats are Already Taking Aim, L.A. TIMES (July 9, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-amy-barrett-supreme-court-20180709-story.html 
(noting that Barrett was confirmed by the United States Senate in 2017). 
 197.  Barrett, supra note 194, at 322. 
 198.  Id. (“The rationale that has been discussed most widely in both the cases and commentary 
is the one I will call ‘congressional acquiescence’—the belief that congressional inaction following 
the Supreme Court's interpretation of a statute reflects congressional acquiescence in it.”). 
 199.  Id. at 322–23. 
 200.  Id. at 323. 
 201.  Id. at 325 (“Justice Black is closely associated with the Supreme Court's statutory stare 
decisis doctrine, for he was one of its most vocal advocates.”). 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. at 325–26. 
 205.  Id. at 326 (explaining that modern textualists are less likely to follow Justice Black’s 
separation of powers rationale and more likely to follow the rationale furthered by Professor 
Marshall); see also Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of 
Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 183 (1989) (arguing that “the Supreme Court should 
adopt an absolute rule of stare decisis for all of its statutory . . . decisions” and “that it is critical to 
reinvolve Congress as an active participant in [the] ongoing process of statutory lawmaking”). 
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interpretive principle derived from, but not required by, the Constitution's 
separation of powers.”206  The doctrine is worthwhile, in Professor Marshall’s 
estimation, because Congress is more likely to amend its own statutes if it 
can confidently predict the Court will refuse to depart from its initial 
interpretation unless Congress tells it to do so.207  In brief, Professor 
Marshall’s argument is that statutory stare decisis encourages Congress to 
take legislative action.208 
Whichever rationale one finds the most persuasive, the fact remains that 
the Court tends to accord its prior statutory interpretations great deference.209  
This provides yet another reason why Justice Kagan was correct that 
Reynolds “effectively resolved” Gundy’s case.210  Both the Reynolds majority 
and dissent agreed that SORNA was designed to reach pre-Act and post-Act 
offenders.211  Thus, to the extent that the Court was required to engage in 
policymaking to interpret SORNA in Reynolds, part of its policy 
determination was that Congress sought for pre-Act offenders to be covered 
in the overall registration scheme.212  Under the doctrine of statutory stare 
decisis, there is no need to revisit that interpretation once again, despite the 
Gundy dissenters’ insistence to the contrary.213  And while adopting the 
dissent’s position would not require directly overturning a statutory 
interpretation, it would undoubtedly undermine the premise on which the 
statutory analysis of Reynolds was based.214  In sum, the Reynolds Court used 
SORNA’s statutory text and legislative history to interpret the Act’s purpose 
and effect,215 but the Gundy dissenters would have the Court re-examine the 
                                                          
 206.  Barrett, supra note 194, at 326–27. 
 207.  Id. at 327 (“In fact, to better serve that end, Marshall proposes that the Supreme Court 
upgrade its statutory presumption from ‘super strong’ to ‘absolute’ on the theory that if Congress 
knows that change can come only from it—i.e., that the Supreme Court will never overrule its 
statutory precedents—Congress will be more likely to override statutory interpretations that it does 
not like.”). 
 208.  Id. (“This version of the separation-of-powers rationale is about creating an incentive for 
congressional action.”). 
 209.  See supra note 194. 
 210.  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2124 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“In Reynolds, 
the Court considered whether SORNA’s registration requirements applied of their own force to pre-
Act offenders or instead applied only once the Attorney General said they did.  We read the statute 
as adopting the latter approach.  But even as we did so, we made clear how far SORNA limited the 
Attorney General’s authority.  And in that way, we effectively resolved the case now before us.”). 
 211.  See supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text. 
 212.  See supra notes 177–178 and accompanying text. 
 213.  See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text. 
 214.  See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (plurality opinion) (“This Court has already interpreted 
§ 20913(d) to . . . require the Attorney General to apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders as soon as 
feasible.”); see also id. at 2124 (“Everything in Reynolds started from the premise that Congress 
meant for SORNA’s registration requirements to apply to pre-Act offenders.”). 
 215.  Id. at 2124. 
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Reynolds judgment as if it never occurred.216  The doctrine of statutory stare 
decisis expressly cautions against this practice.217 
Taken together, it is evident that Congress restricted the extent of 
SORNA’s delegation.218  Congress did not intend to give the Attorney 
General total decisional authority on how to apply SORNA to pre-Act 
offenders, but rather to provide the Attorney General a reasonable amount of 
time to assess the logistical and transitional difficulties of imposing the Act’s 
requirements on pre-Act offenders and to develop a plan so that they too 
would be subject to SORNA.219  The Court has routinely upheld precisely 
this type of delegation.220  If there is a case to be made for reviving the 
nondelegation doctrine, Gundy certainly is not it. 
B.  The Court Correctly Applied the Intelligible Principle Test and 
Recognized That There Are Many Areas of Permissible Delegation 
Not only has the plurality applied a standard (i.e. the intelligible 
principle standard) that is consistent with constitutional stare decisis,221 the 
plurality also has left open the door to using other interpretive mechanisms 
to limit the amount of discretion Congress can confer to administrative 
agencies.222  Thus, a correct statutory reading of SORNA easily leads to the 
conclusion that the Act did not contain an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative power.223 
1.  The Plurality’s Opinion Is Consistent with the Doctrine of 
Constitutional Stare Decisis 
Just as the doctrine of statutory stare decisis provides support for the 
Gundy plurality’s opinion, so too does constitutional stare decisis.224  As 
Section II.C explains, nondelegation inquiries have long been conducted 
under the intelligible principle standard.225  Recall the intelligible principle 
standard requires only that Congress provide a “broad general directive[]” to 
                                                          
 216.  Id. at 2148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Reynolds would make a difference only if it bound 
us as a matter of stare decisis to adopt an interpretation inconsistent with the statute’s terms.  And, 
of course, it does no such thing.”). 
 217.  See supra notes 203 and 207 and accompanying text. 
 218.  See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 219.  See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130 (plurality opinion) (noting that Congress is “dependent” on 
“executive officials to implement its programs”). 
 220.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 221.  See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 222.  See infra Section IV.B.2. 
 223.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (plurality opinion). 
 224.  See id. at 2124 (“Given [our statutory interpretation], Gundy’s constitutional claim must 
fail.  Section 20913(d)’s delegation falls well within permissible bounds.”). 
 225.  See supra Section II.C. 
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guide the delegee’s exercise of power.226  And recall that the Court has 
applied the intelligible principle test to every contested delegation since 1935 
and has—with only two exceptions—always found that Congress provided 
an intelligible principle somewhere within the delegating act.227 
So, the relevant question is: Is SORNA finally an example of a post-
1935 legislative act that has delegated power to the executive branch yet 
failed to provide an intelligible principle?  For the reasons that follow, the 
answer to that question has to be no. 
Section 20913(d) provides an “intelligible principle” to guide the 
Attorney General’s exercise of authority.228  The provision requires the 
Attorney General to apply the registration requirements of SORNA to pre-
Act offenders “as soon as feasible.”229  Put differently, the Attorney General 
had no choice but to require pre-Act offenders to register (just like their post-
Act offender counterparts) as soon as the Department of Justice resolved any 
transitional and practical difficulties inherent to implementing SORNA.230  
Feasibility standards are admittedly imprecise by definition, but the 
intelligible principle standard does not—nor has it ever been construed to—
require exactitude.231  And though the dissent feared that a feasibility 
standard would be immune from meaningful judicial review,232 that fear is 
unfounded.  Suppose the Attorney General refused to apply SORNA’s 
registration requirements to pre-Act offenders for no other reason than he just 
did not feel like it.  In such an instance, the Attorney General clearly would 
have abandoned his responsibility under section 20913(d) to apply those 
registration requirements “as soon as feasible.” 
But cast aside, for a moment, the feasibility standard and assume the 
Gundy dissenters are correct that it is not plausible to read such a standard 
into section 20913(d).233  Are there any other intelligible principles to be 
found in SORNA?  A thorough reading of SORNA’s text reveals that there 
are indeed.  Not only does SORNA limit the universe of offenders who must 
register to only sex offenders, it even identifies which subset of sex offenders 
                                                          
 226.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
 227.  See supra text accompanying note 106. 
 228.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123–24 (plurality opinion). 
 229.  Id. at 2121; see also supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 230.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (plurality opinion) (“The statute conveyed Congress’s policy 
that the Attorney General require pre-Act offenders to register as soon as feasible.  Under the law, 
the feasibility issues he could address were administrative—and, more specifically, transitional—
in nature.”). 
 231.  See supra Section II.C. 
 232.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2145 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 233.  See supra text accompanying notes 181–182.  As discussed supra, there are many reasons 
to believe that the feasibility standard is, in fact, a reasonable interpretation of the section 20913(d) 
mandate.  See supra Section IV.A.1. 
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are subject to the registration requirements.234  It tells us what information 
those sex offenders must provide to be SORNA compliant.235  It tells us how 
quickly after changing their “name, residence, employment, or student 
status” a sex offender must update their registration information to remain 
SORNA compliant.236  And, of course, SORNA tells us what criminal penalty 
attaches for those who fail to comply with the law’s demands.237  In effect, 
each of these provisions are an example of policies or standards that confine 
the Attorney General’s discretion.  And, returning to the feasibility standard, 
SORNA also tells us when the Attorney General must apply each of these 
standards to the pre-Act offenders—the Attorney General must do so as soon 
as feasible.238  As a result, it is hardly difficult for SORNA to pass the 
intelligible principle test.239 
For good measure, consider two other instances when the Court has 
identified an intelligible principle.  In Touby v. United States240—a case about 
the Controlled Substances Act—the Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
statutory amendment that allowed the Attorney General to temporarily 
classify so-called “designer drugs” as schedule I controlled substances.241  
And what “intelligible principle” did Congress provide the Attorney General 
in those instances?  It required only that the Attorney General consider “three 
of the eight factors required for permanent scheduling” and that the Attorney 
General determine that scheduling was necessitated because of an immediate 
hazard to public safety.242  Touby is also notable for what it did not require.  
It did not require the Attorney General to engage in the formal administrative 
rulemaking process nor did it provide any opportunity for meaningful judicial 
review.243  And even though the Attorney General’s scheduling of a 
substance would have the effect of criminalizing that substance’s use, the 
Court still concluded it was not an unconstitutional delegation of power.244 
                                                          
 234.  34 U.S.C. § 20911 (2018) (defining the term “sex offense” and explaining that some sex 
offenses, such as those involving consensual sexual conduct, are not implicated by SORNA’s 
registration requirements). 
 235.  Id. § 20914(d) (explaining that sex offenders must provide, among other things, their name, 
social security number, residential address, and license plate number). 
 236.  Id. § 20913(c) (explaining that the offender must appear in person to notify a sex offender 
registry official of any changes within three business days of such a change occurring). 
 237.  Id. § 20913(e) (“Each jurisdiction, other than a Federally recognized Indian tribe, shall 
provide a criminal penalty that includes a maximum term of imprisonment that is greater than 1 year 
for the failure of a sex offender to comply with the requirements of this subchapter.”). 
 238.  See supra Section IV.A. 
 239.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (plurality opinion). 
 240.  500 U.S. 160 (1991). 
 241.  Id. at 162–63, 169. 
 242.  Id. at 163 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)). 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. at 169. 
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Before Touby, the Mistretta Court upheld the creation of a federal 
Sentencing Commission, even though the Commission was given the power 
to impose binding sentencing ranges on federal trial judges.245  Although the 
Commission was required to consider certain factors as it made its 
determinations, Congress left it to the Commission to determine which 
crimes should be considered similar for purposes of sentencing.246  Congress 
also charged the Commission with the ability to make determinations about 
the severity of offenses.247 
Thus, it cannot be disputed that the delegations in Touby and Mistretta 
gave a great amount of discretion to the Attorney General and Sentencing 
Commission, respectively.  And yet, even then, nearly every member of the 
Court agreed that the delegations were constitutionally permissible.248  The 
discretion in SORNA is nowhere near as great.  Unlike in Mistretta, in which 
the Commission was empowered to determine the severity of criminal 
sanctions, SORNA accords the Attorney General no comparable power.  
Once the Attorney General resolves the transitional difficulties of SORNA, 
both pre-Act and post-Act offenders must be treated exactly the same.249  
SORNA also tells us what penalties non-compliant sex offenders will face.250  
And, unlike in Touby, which effectively permitted the Attorney General to 
make a policy judgment about whether a given substance posed a threat to 
the public,251  the Attorney General is only permitted to delay enforcing 
SORNA against pre-Act offenders for feasibility reasons.252  If the 
delegations in Touby and Mistretta posed no nondelegation concern, Gundy 
should have been a slam dunk.253  It is telling indeed that when asked to 
determine the constitutionality of SORNA “all federal circuit courts 
addressing the issue had rejected . . . nondelegation challenges.”254 
For its part, the dissent made clear that it found little value in the Court’s 
nondelegation precedents.255  Unable to rely on the intelligible principle 
standard to strike down section 20913(d), the dissent instead offered an 
                                                          
 245.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 369 (1989). 
 246.  Id. at 377–78. 
 247.  Id. at 377. 
 248.  See supra note 100 (noting that Justice Scalia was the lone dissenter in Mistretta).  There 
was no dissenting opinion in Touby. 
 249.  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123–24 (2019) (explaining that the Attorney 
General only has discretion to consider and address SORNA’s feasibility issues). 
 250.  34 U.S.C. § 20913(e) (2018). 
 251.  See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
 252.  See supra note 249. 
 253.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (asserting that determining SORNA’s constitutionality “is 
easy”).  
 254.  Wayne A. Logan, Gundy v. United States: Gunning for the Administrative State, 17 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 185, 185 (2019). 
 255.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting). 
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entirely different test for nondelegation challenges.256  But its proposed 
tripartite test is nowhere to be found in Touby, Mistretta, or any other recent 
nondelegation case.  As a result, the dissent’s approach cannot be reconciled 
with principles of constitutional stare decisis.  As Section IV.C.3 explains, it 
is hard to know if the delegations in Touby or Mistretta could survive the 
dissent’s reformulated nondelegation standard.257 
2.  Overbroad Delegations Can Already Be Narrowed or Invalidated 
Through Existing Interpretive Mechanisms 
Nondelegation doctrine aside, there are already other ways, including 
the substantive canons of statutory construction, for the Court to curb broad 
acts of delegation—and the Gundy plurality has done nothing to preclude the 
Court from using those methods in future cases.  As this Section explains, the 
void for vagueness canon, canon of constitutional avoidance, and major 
questions doctrine each remain avenues to limit acts of Congressional 
delegation. 
First, Justice Gorsuch noted in his dissent that the Court’s void for 
vagueness doctrine remains an avenue for challenging laws that could be 
applied arbitrarily.258  It tells us that the Court may invalidate laws that either 
(1) fail to give fair notice of what conduct is prohibited, or (2) are so 
standardless that they effectively encourage arbitrary or discriminatory 
enforcement.259  In either instance, the challenged legislation violates 
principles of due process.260  And according to the Gundy dissent, “most any 
challenge to a legislative delegation can be reframed as a vagueness 
complaint.”261 
Second, though perhaps more controversial, there is the canon of 
constitutional avoidance.262  This canon expresses the idea that if the Court 
is presented with a construction of a statute that raises constitutional doubt, 
the Court should instead construe the statute to avoid the constitutional 
problem “unless such [a] construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.”263  The rationale for the avoidance canon was summarized most 
                                                          
 256.  See supra Section III. 
 257.  See infra Section IV.C.3. 
 258.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2142. 
 259.  Emily M. Snoddon, Comment, Clarifying Vagueness: Rethinking the Supreme Court’s 
Vagueness Doctrine, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 2301, 2302 (2019). 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2142 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting). 
 262.  See VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45153, STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: THEORIES, TOOLS, AND TRENDS 29–30 (2018) (providing an explanation of the 
substantive canons of statutory construction). 
 263.  Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 
568, 575 (1988) (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499–501, 504 (1979)); see 
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effectively by Justice White264: Because Congress (like the Court) “swears 
an oath to uphold the Constitution,” the Court should be reticent to assume 
that Congress would draft a statute that violates the Constitution.265   
Despite its routine use, the avoidance canon has garnered criticism from 
legal scholars, especially those who approach statutory interpretation from a 
textualist perspective.266  As Judge Barrett has argued, substantive canons 
like constitutional avoidance can be used in a manner that is inconsistent with 
congressional intent.267  One can think of this use of constitutional 
avoidance—the variety that “advance[s] policies independent of those 
expressed in the statute”268—as “aggressive avoidance.”  And indeed, 
reluctance to embrace aggressive avoidance has a great deal of logical appeal.  
When the Court strains itself to find any interpretation that will avoid 
constitutional conflict, even if highly implausible and likely contrary to 
Congress’s true intent, the Court has not acted as a faithful agent of 
Congress.269  It has instead rewritten the statute as if the Court were itself a 
legislature.270  It may be a fine line to draw, but there is a distinction between 
interpreting the law, on the one hand, and entirely reshaping a legislative 
enactment, on the other.271 
Still, textualists (Judge Barrett and the late Justice Antonin Scalia 
among them) agree that this concern fades away when two competing 
statutory interpretations are equally plausible and only one of those 
interpretations raises constitutional doubt.272  One can think of this as 
“standard avoidance.”  In those instances, the avoidance canon serves only 
                                                          
also BRANNON, supra note 262, at 29 (noting that the avoidance canon urges reading statutes in a 
manner that “avoid[s] the constitutional issue”). 
 264.  Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575. 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  See generally Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 109 (2010) (explaining the tension between substantive canons of construction and “a strong 
commitment to legislative supremacy”); see also Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive 
Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. 
REV. 164, 169–76 (2019) (arguing that the Gundy plurality aggressively applied the avoidance 
canon). 
 267.  Barrett, supra note 266, at 110 (“A court applying a canon to strain statutory text uses 
something other than the legislative will as its interpretive lodestar, and in so doing, it acts as 
something other than a faithful agent.”). 
 268.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  See id. (noting that an important component of statutory interpretation is the notion of 
legislative supremacy). 
 271.  See id. at 123–24 (“Substantive canons are in significant tension with textualism, however, 
insofar as their application can require a judge to adopt something other than the most textually 
plausible meaning of a statute.”). 
 272.  Id. at 123 (“Substantive canons [like constitutional avoidance] are in no tension with 
faithful agency insofar as they are used as tie breakers between equally plausible interpretations of 
a statute.  Textualists have no difficulty taking policy into account when language is ambiguous.”). 
 
2020] GUNDY V. UNITED STATES 1113 
as “an interpretive tiebreaker—[in other words,] if there are two equally 
plausible readings of the statute, the avoidance canon selects the winner.”273  
The competing interpretations of SORNA are precisely such an example.274  
And in this way, using the canon of constitutional avoidance to read a 
feasibility standard into section 20913(d) is a result that is consistent with 
textualism because the feasibility standard is an equally (if not more) 
reasonable reading of SORNA.275  Thus, one of the more persuasive 
criticisms of the avoidance canon—that it can be used to “select the less 
plausible interpretation if doing so avoids constitutional difficulties”276—is 
inapplicable here.277 
Finally, the Gundy dissenters remind us that the Court has used the 
major questions doctrine to invalidate agency actions that have substantial 
economic and political effects.278  As a general matter, Congress authorizes 
agencies to take certain actions by drafting authorizing statutes.279  Often 
those statutes contain ambiguities.280  And under a well-known 
administrative law doctrine known as Chevron deference, the agencies 
themselves are given leeway to adopt a reasonable interpretation of 
ambiguous statutory directives.281  So long as the agency’s interpretation is 
                                                          
 273.  Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance as Interpretation and as Remedy, 114 MICH. L. 
REV., 1275, 1280 (2016). 
 274.  See supra text accompanying notes 186–187. 
 275.  See supra text accompanying note 188. 
 276.  Fish, supra note 273, at 1280 (emphasis added). 
 277.  But see Bamzai, supra note 266, at 169 (“The plurality’s method of interpreting SORNA 
is an aggressive, albeit implicit, application of the principle that the Court can address nondelegation 
challenges by ‘giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought 
to be unconstitutional.’” (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989))). 
 278.  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“But we 
don’t [allow an executive agency to fill in statutory gaps] when the ‘statutory gap’ concerns ‘a 
question of deep “economic and political significance” that is central to the statutory scheme.’” 
(quoting King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015))). 
 279.  Joshua S. Sellers, “Major Questions” Moderation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 930, 932 
(2019). 
 280.  Id. 
 281.  Id.; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) 
(“If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, 
the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the 
absence of an administrative interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”) (citations omitted); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, 
Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 205–06 (2001) (“In the beginning (at 
least for the purposes of this article), there was Chevron.  The question in that case concerned 
whether the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had acted lawfully when it issued a rule, in 
accordance with applicable notice-and-comment procedures, defining the term ‘stationary source’ 
in the Clean Air Act to refer to whole plants, rather than each pollution-emitting device within them.  
In sustaining the rule, the Court prescribed a by now well-known, two-step inquiry to govern judicial 
review of an agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency administers.  The first question is 
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reasonable, it will be left undisturbed if challenged in court.282  But there is 
an exception.  Under the major questions doctrine, the agency action receives 
considerably less deference when the statutory ambiguity is one that is a 
matter of great political or economic significance.283  In these instances, the 
Court has the ability to override the agency’s interpretation.284 
So, if these interpretive mechanisms (among others) exist as means to 
cabin the amount of authority conferred to the executive branch by legislative 
enactments, why the sudden need to overrule well-settled law to resuscitate 
a doctrine that has long been relegated to the legal history books?  The dissent 
does not offer a sufficiently compelling reason.285 
C.  The Court Underemphasized the Practical Consequences of 
Reviving the Nondelegation Doctrine 
The Gundy Court correctly recognized that nondelegation inquiries are 
basically statutory analyses.286  Thus, as one might expect, Justice Kagan 
spent the bulk of her opinion walking through the plurality’s statutory 
interpretation of SORNA.287  After identifying an intelligible principle in 
section 20913(d) (i.e. the feasibility standard), the plurality concluded that 
SORNA—like so many statutes before it—posed no nondelegation 
problem.288  But largely lost in the plurality’s opinion was a discussion of 
why the Court permits administrative deference in the first place and why the 
approach suggested by the dissent would have such profound consequences 
for the modern administrative state.  In short, the plurality opinion does not 
spend much time discussing the practical problems of reviving the 
nondelegation doctrine other than to warn that “if SORNA’s delegation is 
unconstitutional, then most of Government is unconstitutional.”289  Though 
                                                          
‘whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue’; if so, the agency must 
comply with that judgment.  The second question, reached only if Congress failed to speak clearly, 
is whether the agency has adopted a ‘reasonable’ interpretation of the statute; if so, the courts must 
accept that interpretation.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 282.  Sellers, supra note 279, at 932. 
 283.  Id. at 946 (explaining that “major questions” allow the Court to “circumvent the traditional 
deference regime”). 
 284.  Id. at 947 (noting that critics assert the major questions doctrine “has almost invariably 
been used in opposition to agency action”). 
 285.  In fact, the dissent undercut its argument that such a dramatic reversal was appropriate 
when it readily acknowledged that the Court has never “just throw[n] up [its] hands” in instances 
where “the separation of powers is at stake.”  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2142 (2019) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 286.  Id. at 2123 (plurality opinion) (“[A] nondelegation inquiry always begins (and often almost 
ends) with statutory interpretation.”). 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Id. at 2129. 
 289.  Id. at 2130. 
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not in an exhaustive manner, this Section seeks to fill that gap.  Section 
IV.C.1 discusses the institutional competency argument for allowing 
administrative agencies to exercise delegated powers.290  Section IV.C.2 
explains that upholding acts of congressional delegation promotes judicial 
restraint.291  Lastly, Section IV.C.3 examines the logistical complications 
inherent to a revival of the nondelegation doctrine.292 
1.  The Current Application of the Nondelegation Doctrine 
Recognizes the Institutional Competencies of the Respective 
Branches of Government 
As an initial matter, it is worth considering why the Court should (and 
does) permit delegations of power in the first place.  One of the main reasons 
for allowing limited delegations of authority is that Congress cannot perform 
its lawmaking function if it is bogged down by the minutiae of implementing 
those governmental programs itself.293  A complementary argument can be 
made that, at least in some instances, an executive department or agency is 
more institutionally competent to work through the nuances of administering 
a complex law than a legislative body.294  As such, Congress simply assigns 
this work to those administrative agencies.295 
This argument is especially compelling in instances when the agency is 
tasked with resolving issues that are highly technical or scientific in nature.296  
But even when the delegation is not because a heightened level of expertise 
is needed (for example, if the delegation exists to address feasibility 
concerns), an administrative agency may still be the better institution to deal 
with the underlying problem.297  In these instances, there is simply no need 
for Congress to expend the time necessary to contemplate every possible 
transitional hurdle involved in enforcing a new statutory scheme.  The 
intelligible principle standard, thus, recognizes that Congress should instead 
                                                          
 290.  See infra Section IV.C.1. 
 291.  See infra Section IV.C.2. 
 292.  See infra Section IV.C.3. 
 293.  See supra text accompanying note 101. 
 294.  See supra note 219. 
 295.  See Jack M. Beermann, The Never-Ending Assault on the Administrative State, 93 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1599, 1602 (2018) (explaining that “[t]he administrative state was designed by 
Congress” itself). 
 296.  Id. at 1647 (“But properly applied, the doctrines that instruct courts to defer to agencies 
involve well-thought-out agency policies informed by scientific judgments, longstanding 
acquaintance with the issues involved or express delegations from Congress to make particular 
determinations.”). 
 297.  Id. at 1651 (“In today’s world of global interdependence and economic, political, and 
security threats emerging from every corner of the planet, any other course of action for the United 
States [other than one involving a regulatory regime] would be foolhardy.”). 
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focus on the “big picture,” not the intricacies of enforcing the law.298  Indeed, 
this is the purpose of the executive branch. 
Additionally, limited delegation of policymaking power to the executive 
branch allows agencies to “respond to changing circumstances” (via the 
administrative rulemaking process) more quickly than is possible through the 
traditional legislative process.299  Consider, for example, how SORNA might 
have been affected had Congress specified a particular timeline for 
enforcement of the registration requirements against pre-Act offenders.  Say 
section 20913(d) mandated a five-year phase-in period before SORNA’s 
registration requirements would apply to pre-Act offenders but that the 
Attorney General found a workable solution that could be implemented 
within six months.  What reason would there be to prevent the Attorney 
General from acting swiftly?  And outside of the SORNA context, the 
examples are even clearer.  Suppose a vehicle safety report was released that 
recommended a new (and relatively inexpensive) innovation in airbag 
equipment that could save thousands of lives.  Is there any good reason to 
wait for Congress to pass a new piece of legislation when the Department of 
Transportation, staffed with experts on automotive safety, could do so more 
quickly?  Probably not—especially given that those agency experts are still 
required to follow the intelligible principle(s) that Congress has provided to 
guide its decisional authority.300 
2.  The Current Application of the Nondelegation Doctrine 
Recognizes the Value of Judicial Restraint 
In his impassioned dissent in Gundy, Justice Gorsuch extolled the 
virtues of the separation of powers and political accountability and explained 
the thought process undergirding the Framers’ design of the American 
constitutional structure.301  According to the dissent, these principles and 
foundational history cannot be squared with the Court’s current approach to 
                                                          
 298.  See id. at 1609 (“Legislatively, for the most part Congress has been supportive of the 
administrative state.  After all, the existence and structure of federal agencies is based on statutes 
passed by Congress.  Congress consistently delegates authority to administrative agencies, shields 
some of them from complete presidential control, and prescribes deferential judicial review of 
agency action while occasionally exempting some agency actions from review altogether.”). 
 299.  Kathryn E. Kovacs, Did the Dissent in Gundy v. United States Open Up a Can of Worms?, 
AM. CONST. SOC’Y: EXPERT F. (June 24, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/did-the-
dissent-in-gundy-v-united-states-open-up-a-can-of-worms/. 
 300.  See supra Section II.C (explaining the intelligible principle standard). 
 301.  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that the Framers believed our system of governance would be frustrated if Congress were permitted 
to “announce vague aspirations and then assign others the responsibility of adopting legislation to 
realize its goals”). 
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the nondelegation doctrine.302  Yet, the approach the dissent proposed would 
raise a jurisprudential dilemma of a different kind—namely, whether it gives 
due respect to the value of judicial restraint.  And indeed, this argument 
complements the institutional competency argument.303 
When Congress decides to delegate power from itself to the executive 
branch, it is doing so because it has made a judgment that the executive 
branch can properly exercise that delegated power.  But successful 
invocations of the nondelegation doctrine necessarily mean that the Court has 
used its power of judicial review to substitute its judgment over that of 
Congress.304  Of course, no one suggests that this means Congress can never 
go too far in its delegations.  In some instances, the congressional delegation 
of power may be so all-encompassing that it offends the separation of powers.  
And in these situations—situations where there is no intelligible principle to 
guide the delegee’s exercise of power—the nondelegation doctrine remains 
a viable option.  Even still, without reaching the nondelegation question, the 
Court will likely be able to invoke the major questions doctrine or a 
substantive canon of statutory construction to read the delegation 
narrowly.305  And if the Court chooses to adopt an equally plausible (yet 
narrower) interpretation to avoid a constitutional conflict, the Court is acting 
as a faithful agent of Congress by giving meaning to the statutory language 
embedded within the challenged act.306 
Still, larger problems with reviving the nondelegation doctrine exist.  
Judges may resort to their own ideological priors and policy preferences to 
distinguish permissible delegations from those that are impermissible.307  
Take, for example, one of the prongs of the dissent’s tripartite analysis—the 
“fill up the details” test.308  How is the Court supposed to distinguish a 
                                                          
 302.  Id. at 2139 (arguing that the intelligible principle standard has “take[n] on a life of its own” 
that is completely divorced from its original meaning and context). 
 303.  See supra Section IV.C.1. 
 304.  In other words, the Court is overriding Congress’s judgment that certain details are best 
left to the Executive to discern.  See Lisa Heinzerling, How the Supreme Court Created a 
Constitutional Case Against the Administrative State, AM. CONST. SOC’Y: EXPERT F. (Aug. 29, 
2018), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/how-the-supreme-court-created-a-constitutional-case-
against-the-administrative-state/ (“As Justice Scalia once wrote, given the ‘multifarious’ and 
‘highly political’ nature of the relevant inquiry, the Court has ‘almost never felt qualified to second-
guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those 
executing or applying that law.’”).  This judgment substitution takes shape in the most dramatic 
fashion—eliminating entire provisions of legislative enactments.  See id. 
 305.  See supra Section IV.B.2. 
 306.  Barrett, supra note 266, at 123. 
 307.  Heinzerling, supra note 304 (“A large worry is that unelected judges applying a revitalized 
nondelegation doctrine would be left to follow their own, personal impulses in drawing the line 
separating acceptable from unacceptable delegations.”). 
 308.  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)). 
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“detail” from an integral part of a statutory scheme?  The dissent does not tell 
us.  As a consequence, there is little to stop the “fill up the details” test from 
becoming anything more than a subjective value judgment by the reviewing 
court.309 
Judicial overreach becomes even more troublesome given that the risk 
would be created by disregarding nearly a century of precedent because, 
according to the dissenters, the Court seems to have misunderstood a key 
aspect of constitutional law each time it has been asked to resolve a case 
about it.310  In essence, the dissent has argued that time and time again the 
Court has applied the wrong standard to contested acts of delegation.311 
And even though the dissent cleverly characterizes its approach as a 
mere return to the “traditional rule” of nondelegation,312 everyone—
including the dissent’s author—acknowledges that the dissent’s proposed 
standard is a significant departure from the approach to nondelegation 
inquiries that the Court has used in every nondelegation challenge since 
1935.313  Given this history, adopting the dissent’s tripartite approach and 
discarding the intelligible principle standard as it has been applied for the last 
eighty-five years would embody judicial hubris of the very worst kind. 
3.  Reviving the Nondelegation Doctrine Would Result in a Logistical 
Nightmare 
Finally, it remains unclear how the dissent would apply its proposed 
standard to the acts of delegation (too numerous to name) that have survived 
under the existing intelligible principle standard but would trigger scrutiny 
under the dissent’s tripartite test.314  Indeed, the Court’s longstanding 
approach to the nondelegation doctrine has proven imminently workable 
because only the most egregious acts of delegation come within its reach.315  
This has in turn given Congress the ability mostly to determine for itself 
                                                          
 309.  Id. 
 310.  See supra Sections II.B–C, IV.B. 
 311.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 312.  Id. at 2139. 
 313.  See id. at 2130 (plurality opinion) (explaining that “most of Government is 
unconstitutional” under the dissent’s view of nondelegation); see also id. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (noting that SORNA’s delegation is permissible “under the approach [the] Court has 
taken for many years”); id. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the dissent’s approach is 
a return to a “more traditional separation-of-powers test[]” and a departure from the Court’s 
“mutated version of the ‘intelligible principle’” test). 
 314.  See Brief for the United States at 56, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086) (“If petitioner 
means to argue that Congress can never confer authority on the Executive to make such 
determinations, his rule would be at odds with this Court’s many decisions to the contrary, and it 
would frustrate Congress’s ability to enlist the Executive’s assistance in dealing with complex and 
changing problems.” (citations omitted)). 
 315.  See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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which decisions are best left to departmental and agency experts,316 and it has 
prevented the courts from becoming overburdened with nondelegation 
claims.317  Most importantly, it recognizes the large role the administrative 
state now plays in American government.318  Congressional delegations are 
simply a fact of life in modern governance.319  Everything from clean air 
standards320 to financial regulation,321 food and drug laws,322 and workplace 
safety rules323 are a product of the administrative process that necessarily 
involve delegations of power from Congress to administrative agencies.324  
In fact, (depending on who you ask) there are more than 400—yes, 400—
administrative agencies responsible for making these determinations.325  And 
all of these agencies exist because Congress has delegated power to them to 
                                                          
 316.  William D. Araiza, Toward a Non-Delegation Doctrine That (Even) Progressives Could 
Like, AM. CONST. SOC’Y SUP. CT. REV., 2018-2019, at 211, 219–220, https://www.acslaw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/ACS-Supreme-Court-Review-2018-2019.pdf (noting that Congress often 
delegates power in the face of a lack of substantive expertise or because of Congress’s own 
“institutional inflexibility”); see also supra Section IV.B. 
 317.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: How the Roberts Court Could Alter the 
Administrative State, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Sept. 4, 2019), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky-the-roberts-court-could-alter-the-
administrative-state (explaining that new limits on the administrative state would lead to an increase 
in “judicial review of agency decisions”). 
 318.  Nicholas Bagley, “Most of Government Is Unconstitutional,” N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/opinion/sunday/gundy-united-states.html (“Since 1935, the 
Supreme Court has approved laws telling agencies to regulate ‘in the public interest’ and to set 
pollution standards ‘requisite to protect the public health.’  Not once in the 84 years since has the 
Supreme Court invalidated a law because it offends the so-called nondelegation doctrine.”). 
 319.  See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 295, at 1602 (“Administrative state skeptics, especially in 
the academy . . . continue to take aim at the heart of the administrative state.  Unfortunately for 
administrative state skeptics, the courts and Congress consistently turn those efforts back, 
maintaining the features of the administrative state by and large intact.”). 
 320.  Id. at 1612 (“[A]nd any suggestion that the Court was ready to reinvigorate the 
nondelegation doctrine was laid to rest in the Court’s 2001 decision upholding a key provision of 
the Clean Air Act against a nondelegation challenge.”).  But see Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 
2116, 2131–48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of a reinvigorated nondelegation 
doctrine). 
 321.  See Beermann, supra note 295, at 1646 (“The regulatory standards enforced through 
inspections and subpoenas protect the physical and financial well-being of millions of people, 
ranging from workers who rely on OSHA safety standards in their workplaces to patients who rely 
on the FDA to ensure the safety of drugs, medical devices, and food products to investors who rely 
on the SEC and other agencies to ensure the safety of financial products and markets.”). 
 322.  Id. 
 323.  Id. 
 324.  Id. at 1612 
 325.  See Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., How Many Federal Agencies Exist? We Can’t Drain The 
Swamp Until We Know, FORBES (July 5, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2017/07 
/05/how-many-federal-agencies-exist-we-cant-drain-the-swamp-until-we-know/#4f9078f21aa2 
(explaining the difficulty of counting how many federal agencies there are). 
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create rules and regulations germane to their respective areas of expertise.326  
But if the intelligible principle standard were tossed away, all of these 
delegations could presumably be litigated (or re-litigated) in the federal 
courts.327  Whether they would survive is anyone’s guess. 
Thus, as Professor Lisa Heinzerling has explained, the consequences of 
reviving the nondelegation doctrine would be devastating for the U.S. 
regulatory framework.328  According to Professor Heinzerling: 
In determining the constitutional validity of the modern 
administrative state, the nondelegation doctrine is the big one.  The 
only doctrine that could come close, in terms of damage to the 
premises underlying the administrate state, would be the 
substantive due process theory embraced and then abandoned in 
the first half of the twentieth century.329 
Not to worry, the Gundy dissent says,330 some already-approved delegations 
are consistent with its reformulated standard.331  But left unsaid is which (or 
how many) delegations would not survive.  More to the point, the dissent 
does not explain—as a practical matter—how the courts, Congress, and the 
executive branch would clean up the mess that would be made if countless 
acts of delegation suddenly became constitutionally nonviable.332  Certainly, 
these are questions that must be answered before dismantling a “federal 
government [that has grown] explosively.”333 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Gundy v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that section 20913(d) of SORNA does not violate the nondelegation doctrine 
because the provision requires the Attorney General to apply SORNA’s 
registration requirements to pre-Act offenders “as soon as feasible.”334  The 
Court was correct in its judgment because the Court’s statutory interpretation 
of SORNA was consistent with its prior decision in Reynolds v. United States, 
and because the outcome in Gundy was within the bounds of the intelligible 
                                                          
 326.  See Beermann, supra note 295, at 1605 (“Further, Congress has instructed federal courts 
reviewing the exercise of regulatory discretion to defer to agency judgments, and the courts, 
including the Supreme Court, have embraced that requirement with alacrity.”).  
 327.  See Chemerinsky, supra note 317. 
 328.  Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933, 1970 (2017). 
 329.  Id. 
 330.  Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2145 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing 
the dissent’s approach would not “spell doom for what some call the ‘administrative state’”). 
 331.  Id. 
 332.  See Bagley, supra note 318. 
 333.  Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137. 
 334.  See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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principle test that the Court has used in nondelegation cases since 1935.335  
But the plurality’s opinion would have been more persuasive had it 
emphasized the negative practical consequences likely to follow from 
adopting the dissent’s position.336 
                                                          
 335.  See supra Section IV.A–B. 
 336.  See supra Section IV.C. 
